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ABSTRACT 
Mobile systems offer portable and interactive computing – 
empowering users – to exploit a multitude of context-sensitive 
services, including mobile healthcare. Mobile health applications 
(i.e., mHealth apps) are revolutionizing the healthcare sector by 
enabling stakeholders to produce and consume healthcare services. 
A widespread adoption of mHealth technologies and rapid increase 
in mHealth apps entail a critical challenge, i.e., lack of security 
awareness by end-users regarding health-critical data. This paper 
presents an empirical study aimed at exploring the security 
awareness of end-users of mHealth apps. We collaborated with two 
mHealth providers in Saudi Arabia to gather data from 101 end-
users. The results reveal that despite having the required 
knowledge, end-users lack appropriate behaviour , i.e., reluctance 
or lack of understanding to adopt security practices – 
compromising health-critical data with social, legal, and financial 
consequences. The results emphasize that mHealth providers 
should ensure security training of end-users (e.g., threat analysis 
workshops), promote best practices to enforce security (e.g., multi-
step authentication), and adopt suitable mHealth apps (e.g., trade-
offs for security vs usability). The study provides empirical 
evidence and a set of guidelines about security awareness of 
mHealth apps. 
CCS Concepts 
• Software and its engineering • Security and privacy ➝ Software 
and application security; Human and societal aspects of security 
and privacy • Human-centered computing ➝ Ubiquitous and 
mobile computing; Empirical studies in ubiquitous and mobile 
computing.  
Keywords 
Mobile Systems and Applications, Mobile Healthcare, Software 
Engineering for Mobile Computing, Empirical Software 
Engineering. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile systems support portable computing that enable users to 
exploit context-sensitive services such as social networking, 
crowd-sensing, mobile commerce, and healthcare [1]. Mobile 
healthcare (i.e., mHealth) relies on (i) embedded sensors of a device 
(hardware to sense health-critical data), (ii) mobile apps (software 
to manipulate sensed data), and (iii) networking technologies 
(protocols to wirelessly transmit data). World Health Organization 
(WHO) refers to mHealth as medical healthcare practices, enabled 
via pervasive technologies, to facilitate stakeholders (e.g., health 
units, medics, patients) that provide or utilize healthcare services in 
an automated, efficient, and reliable manner. A widespread 
adoption of mobile computing has resulted in a rapid proliferation 
of mHealth apps that range from general apps such as decision 
support, vitals, and reproductive health to fitness monitoring apps 
for activity tracking and nutrition management [2]. The usage of 
mHealth apps by healthcare practitioners and patients is on a rise 
with 350,000 such apps available in two of the major app 
repositories provided by Android and iOS platforms [3]. 
Research2Guidance (R2G), a consultancy organization for 
mHealth technologies, reports that 78,000 new mHealth apps were 
added to apps stores in 2017 [4] with market revenue for digital 
health expected to reach USD 31 billion by 2020 [5]. Despite the 
offered benefits [6] and expected revenues [5] of mHealth systems, 
security of health-critical data remains a challenge for sustained 
growth and mass-scale adoption of mHealth apps [7-10]. The 
interest of attackers in health-critical data (pulse rate, blood-
pressure, disease symptoms, etc.) has increased due to its value in 
the ‘black market’ as well as social, legal, and financial 
consequences of compromised data [11]. According to the 
Ponemon Institute, the price per single medical record escalated 
from $369 in 2016 to $380 in 2017 due to the regulations and their 
implementations to secure health-critical data [12].  
Security of mHealth apps is a critical challenge due to pervasive 
environment in which mobile devices continuously ingest health-
critical data from embedded sensors, process and persist data inside 
the device, and transmit it across ad-hoc networks [8, 13]. Experts 
believe that technical solutions such as authentication and multi-
step authorization cannot address security issues alone, instead the 
role of end-users and their understanding of security related issues 
is essential to ensure secure mobile computing [14]. Some recent 
studies have highlighted that social engineering method can be used 
by hackers to deceive end-users into leaking their private 
information [15, 16]. Such security lapses are common in mHealth 
solutions as the end-users usually lack sufficient awareness about 
security configurations, critical warnings, and consequences of 
security breaches [17]. A recently conducted study of secure 
mHealth app development has highlighted that developers who 
follow a predefined software development lifecycle (SDLC) often 
assume that they have already delivered a secure app [18]. 
However, end-users may find security features hard to understand, 
get deceived by hackers, or misled by app permissions to disclose 
private and sensitive information [16]. Due to different categories 
of mHealth apps (e.g., clinical health, fitness monitoring, and health 
diagnostics) end-users behave differently depending of the type of 
apps being used and their security awareness [19, 20]. The existing 
research on this topic, such as [7, 8, 10], indicate that security of 
mHealth apps lags behind the capabilities of hackers that target 
mHealth apps. In a recent study [18], the authors present 
developers’ perspectives on the challenges, recommended 
practices, and motivators for developing secure mHealth apps. To 
date, there has been no empirical effort aimed at investigating the 
security awareness of end-users towards the usage of mHealth apps 
for clinical settings. The study presented in this paper complements 
the existing research on developers’ perspective [18] by empirically 
investigating end-users’ security awareness of mHealth apps that 
contain health-critical and other personal data. 
We conducted an empirical study - collaborating with two 
commercial mHealth providers1 in Saudi Arabia - to survey 101 
end-users of mHealth apps for investigating the level of security 
awareness among end-users. Security awareness of end-users refers 
to the ‘required human knowledge, attitude, and behaviour to 
understand the potential security risks, their implications, and 
available countermeasures for securing mHealth’ [15]. The 
surveyed users are affiliated in different professional roles such as 
clinical practitioners, medical doctors, nurses, and healthcare 
supervisors with the above mentioned health providers. 
Demography analysis of the end-users highlight their diverse 
educational backgrounds, IT skills, years of experience with usage 
of various mHealth apps on different mobile devices compatible 
with major mobile computing platforms including Android and 
iOS. For this study, we utilized the Human Aspects of Information 
Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) [17] that allows to measure 
security awareness through Knowledge, Attitude and Behaviour  
(KAB) model [21]. To measure and understand the security-
awareness, we formulated the following Research Questions 
(RQs):  
RQ1: What is the level of security knowledge, attitude, and 
behaviour of end-users about mHealth apps? 
RQ2: What are the relationships between security knowledge, 
attitude and behaviour? And how do they influence the end-users 
while utilizing mHealth apps? 
To analyze the collected data for answering the RQs, we used 
statistical methods, including descriptive analysis, data correlation 
of survey statements, and regression testing of the recorded 
responses. The results highlight that end-users' security knowledge 
strongly influences their attitude (i.e., they understand what 
potential threats are). However, end-users' security knowledge has 
no significant impact on their behaviour (i.e., they lack necessary 
actions about how to protect data from potential threats). Security 
training, recommended practices, and adoption of appropriate 
mHealth apps, both at individual and organization level are the key 
to secure utilization of mHealth services.  
The study provides empirical evidence about the level of end-
users' security awareness, i.e., (i) knowledge about recurring 
security threats, (ii) attitude to securing their data, and (iii) 
behaviour to mitigate the threats by adopting security practices. 
This study provides empirical evidence and a set of guidelines to 
facilitate researchers, practitioners, and stakeholders to develop and 
adopt secure mHealth apps for clinical practices and public health. 
2. RELATED WORK 
We now review the related work generally classified as (i) security 
awareness of end-users (Section 2.1), and (ii) approaches to 
measure security awareness (Section 2.2). The review helps us to 
motivate this study and introduces terminologies and concepts that 
are used in this study.  
2.1 Security Awareness of End-Users of 
mHealth Apps 
mHealth apps to support clinical practices are primarily for 
commercial purposes to enrich users’ experience by offering 
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customized functionality and automating trivial tasks of healthcare 
[13]. Currently, healthcare providers are adopting such mHealth 
apps to empower patients by providing healthcare services that are 
pervasive, readily available, efficient, and cost-effective [13, 16]. 
For example, many healthcare services such as diagnosing cardio 
rate, measuring blood pressure, or detecting fever can be performed 
at users’ end to eliminate prior appointments or personal visits to 
health units. Moreover, mHealth apps enable end-users to 
electronically view, share, and manage their medical history, 
including but not limited to lab reports, radiology images, and 
scheduled appointments [22]. Despite the offered benefits, patients’ 
health-critical data is at risk either due to security flaws in an app 
[7, 8, 10] or lack of security awareness by app users [7, 16]. 
Lack of security awareness: A study reported in [19] engaged 24 
focus groups with more than 250 participants to examine end-users’ 
attitudes and perceptions regarding mHealth systems being used at 
healthcare centers. The study revealed that end-users’ attitudes 
were highly contextualized towards security depending on the type 
of information being communicated, rational for such 
communication, and consumers of shared information. From the 
app development perspective, the security of mHealth apps can be 
enhanced by implementing different control mechanisms (e.g., 
encryption, authentication, secure storage, access control) that 
support confidentiality and integrity of data [23]. The adoption of 
mHealth apps by health providers as well as end-users is on a steady 
rise, however; some recent studies have reported that low 
knowledge of security features for end-users is still an issue [16, 
24-26]. The authors in [27] pointed out that today’s smartphones 
implement many security features that range from device lock 
mechanisms to remote data wiping or end to end encryption. 
However, even the most advanced systems or sophisticated features 
of security cannot guarantee users’ behaviour and actions that 
enhance or compromise security and privacy of their classified data 
[19, 28]. A recent study of more than 450 smartphone owners 
indicates that they do not use or are unaware of security features 
provided by default [28]. In the case of mHealth systems, patients 
as end-users might grant more permissions than necessary to 
unintentionally share their health data or allow other apps to 
unnecessarily access it [16]. A recently conducted mapping study 
[29] also indicates that, despite implementing the state-of-the-art 
security features for mHealth app, lack of knowledge about the 
security features or privacy permissions by end-users can 
compromise personal information and health-critical data.  The 
mapping study reviews 365 studies (published research) and 
suggests that security and privacy specific education and training 
of app developers and users are two of the most critical factors to 
support secure development and usage of mHealth systems.  
Enabling security awareness: Developers, providers, and 
consumers (commercial enterprises) need to play their roles in 
increasing the end-users’ security awareness [16, 26]. For 
examples, commercial enterprises as consumers of mHealth 
systems can provide training and guidelines to explain security 
features of an app to it’s end-users (e.g., doctors, nurses, clinical 
technicians, patients). Similarly, developers of mHealth apps can 
engineer their apps to support effective security decisions and 
facilitate (or enforce) end-users to follow security practices. A 
typical example of security enforcement by an app can be password 
management schemes that refuse to accept a weak password or 
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multi-step authentication to access private data [30]. To enhance 
security awareness, mHealth apps can explicitly indicate access 
permissions that are essential or optional for end-user to select. As 
opposed to the adaptive security [31] that enables apps and devices 
to configure their security protocols at runtime, human-centric 
security focuses on secure development and usage practices (i.e., 
users' actions) to enhance the security of mobile systems [17, 18]. 
2.2 Approaches to Measure End-Users’ 
Security Awareness 
Security awareness is mostly measured by end-users feedback via 
survey or questionnaire-based studies such as [17, 32]. The authors 
of [26] conducted simulation exercises as controlled experiments to 
understand participants’ behaviours and reaction corresponding to 
their security awareness about potential threats. Survey or 
simulation-based approaches to measure security awareness can be 
helpful to identify users’ perspective and behaviours, highlighting 
human intellect, attitude, and weaknesses while facing potential 
security threats [22, 23, 26].  
Models for measuring security-awareness: HAIS-Q is a well-
known approach that has been used and validated in several studies 
[17, 21] to measure information security awareness for a diverse 
group of users (e.g., students, professionals, and volunteers). Some 
studies have followed the HAIS-Q guidelines [14] to measure 
security awareness of smartphone users [33]. The Knowledge, 
Attitude, and Behaviour (KAB) model that underpins HAIS-Q aims 
to investigate psychological aspects and their impact on 
(information security) awareness [34]. KAB model refers to a 
representative study of a specific population that collects 
information about what is known, believed, and done about a 
particular topic [35]. Knowledge refers to the level of security 
knowledge that users already know, an attitude refers to how the 
users feel about the knowledge, and behaviour refers to the actions 
that users may perform to ensure security [17].  
The existing studies, e.g. [19, 20], focus on users’ security 
perceptions of fitness monitoring apps such as activity tracking, 
step counters, and cardio rate analysis. Unlike the fitness 
monitoring apps, clinical mHealth apps such as patient 
management systems handle highly sensitive health-critical data 
and personal information. The scope of this study is to investigate 
security awareness and guidelines for the class of clinical health 
systems in the context of mHealth. From an operational 
perspective, clinical health apps collect patients’ health data, 
personal information, and medical history that is electronically 
shared across health care units among different medical 
professionals – involving a multitude of security issues. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no empirical study to investigate end-
users’ perspectives and security awareness toward using clinical 
mHealth apps.  
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this section, we discuss the research method that comprises of 
four phases to conduct this study. The overall research method and 
its individual phases are illustrated in Figure 1. 
3.1 Phase I – Design the Study Protocol  
We developed the study’s protocol in the initial phase, shown in 
Figure 1, that comprises of three steps including (i) specification of 
research questions (ii) designing survey questionnaire, and (iii) 
identify data access methods. As part of this phase, we performed 
the literature review (Section 2) to devise two RQs (Section 1). The 
RQs drove the design of the survey questionnaire, which was based 
on the KAB model [33] that underpins HAIS-Q [17, 21]. The 
literature review also pointed out that human aspects, i.e., end-users 
are concerned about four issues (a) what methods are used to access 
their health-critical data, (b) who can access their data, for (c) what 
purposes their data is being accessed, and (d) how their data is being 
stored and transmitted. Figure 2 shows four security mechanisms 
(i.e., solutions) that can be classified as eight security critical 
scenarios (i.e., instance of a solution). For each security critical 
scenario, we formulated a security knowledge statement, an attitude 
statement and a behaviour statement as in Figure 2. For example, 
as per Figure 2, a knowledge statement can be expressed as ‘I 
should use strong password (not easy to guess) for mHealth app’. 
A total of 23 statements (S1 – S23) were formulated that are 
classified as 08 statements for measuring security knowledge, 08 
statements to measure end-users’ attitude, and 07 statements for 
measuring end-users’ behaviour toward using mHealth apps. We 
provided three options in our survey questionnaire (i.e., True, False, 
and Don't know) to the end-users. It is worth mentioning that we 
excluded statement about data encryption from the behaviour since 
encrypting data is an automated process of an app and does not 
represent an actionable task for end-users. Figure 2 provides an 
example of how we measured the security awareness of mHealth 
apps end-users using the KAB model [33]. 
Figure 1 - Overview of the Research Methodology 
 3.2 Phase II – Outline Research Hypothesis  
We outlined three research hypothesis and correlation between 
them to validate the survey findings as in Figure 1 (Phase 2). The 
research in [21] confirms that raising the knowledge level of 
information security and procedures would increase end-users’ 
attitude towards information security policy and procedures, which 
should translate into more risk-averse information security 
behaviour. Based on the guidelines from [30], we outlined the 
following hypotheses (H1 to H3):  
H1: Security knowledge of the end-users of mHealth apps has a 
positive correlation with their attitude. 
H2: Attitude of the end-users of mHealth apps is positively 
correlated with their behaviour. 
H3: Security knowledge for the end-users of mHealth apps has a 
positive correlation with their behaviour. 
The hypotheses positively correlate end-users’ security 
knowledge, attitude, and behaviour to measure their security 
awareness for mHealth apps. The hypotheses can be tested based 
on qualitative analysis of the survey data from end-users of 
mHealth apps that is detailed next. 
3.3 Phase III – Collect End-Users’ Responses  
The third phase of methodology is focused on data collection from 
end-users of two major mHealth providers. End-users’ data via 
survey questionnaire was collected in collaboration with two 
mHealth providers namely (i) KFMC - King Fahad Medical City 
(having iKFMC app) and (ii) HMG - Dr. Sulaiman Al Habib 
Medical Group (having Dr. Sulaiman Alhabib app). The link to 
the survey-based questionnaire, responses from end-users, and 
extended details demographic information are provided in [36]. 
These health providers were purposefully chosen because they 
provide mHealth apps to allow their users to access a wide range of 
services such as creating, storing, and sharing medical records, 
viewing scanned images, lab results, and automating their clinical 
practices. The first author personally visited both mHealth 
providers during January and February 2020 to carry out the study 
and collect data. All of the end-users that we surveyed and both the 
mHealth providers were based in Saudi Arabia thus limiting the 
geo-distribution of survey participants and its impact on study 
findings. Some travel restrictions globally, during the said time-
period, also limited our planned on-site data collection from more 
countries. Extended work is in progress - designing and deploying 
web-based survey and a case study - to seek feedback from 
geographically diverse end-users and their healthcare providers. 
Potential respondents were asked to join our study while they were 
waiting for their turns to see their doctors. A brief explanation for 
our research was given, and we assured them that they are free to 
withdraw anytime, should they like to. We ensured that all our 
respondents were: i) ≥ 18-year-old, and ii) currently using the 
provided mHealth apps. We conducted pilot testing for our 
questionnaire with ten respondents to mitigate any of their concerns 
(e.g., wording problems, statement ambiguity). After removing 
incomplete responses, we obtained 101 responses from the end-
users of KFMC and HMG. At the beginning of our survey, we 
asked our respondents to answer a few questions related to their 
background (demographic details), followed by the main topics 
under investigation (security awareness). Figure 3 (a - f) presents a 
summary of our respondents’ demographic information including 
(1) mobile platforms and (2) mobile devices of end-users, their (3) 
gender classification, (4) age group, (5) IT knowledge level, (6) 
formal education, and (7) mHealth app usage. The participants’ 
demographic information is used to contextualize the responses to 
the main questions of the survey. For example, analyzing the age, 
level of IT knowledge, or education level (e.g., Bachelors’ degree, 
Diploma) of end-users’ can help better understand security-
awareness for a specific group of users. 
3.4  Phase IV – Perform Data Analysis  
We used a well-known data analysis software, SPSS version 27 
(IBM), for the quantitative analysis of our collected data. 
Descriptive analysis, along with mean and Standard Deviation (SD) 
were conducted to report the respondents' demographic data 
(Figure 3) and the survey responses (Phase III). We calculated the 
Cronbach Alpha to measure the reliability and internal consistency 
of our survey statements. To test the research hypotheses (Phase 
III), we performed two linear regression tests, firstly, to predict the 
respondents' attitude according to their mean knowledge, and 
secondly, to predict the respondents' behaviour based on their mean 
knowledge and mean attitude. 
Figure 2 - Overview of Security Awareness Measurement 
for End-Users using the KAB Model. 
Ethics Approvals: Both health providers granted us permission to 
use end-users’ feedback and other relevant data, for research 
purposes only, through their Institutional Review Board (KFMC 
approval number: 19-462E, HMG approval number: HAP-01-R-
082). Furthermore, our study is approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number 
H-2019-165). Further details of the methodology, statistical data 
analysis and ethics approval are in [36].  
4. RESULTS OF END-USERS’ SECURITY 
AWARENESS 
We now present the results that reflect end-users’ security 
awareness towards the usage of mHealth apps. The results provide 
answers to RQ-1s in Section 1, and RQ-2 in Section 4.2. 
4.1 End-Users’ Security Knowledge, Attitude, 
and Behaviour (RQ-1) 
As per the research methodology (Phase 4, Fig. 1), we applied a 
number of statistical methods to formalize data analysis (measuring 
consistency, correlation, and description) of end-users’ responses 
[36] presented in Table 1 – Table 5.   
A. Measuring Consistency of Survey Statements: To answer RQ1, 
Table 1 below presents Cronbach’s alpha to measure the internal 
consistency of the survey statements, i.e., how our survey 
statements are closely related to measure end-user security 
knowledge, attitude, and behaviour while using mHealth apps [37]. 
Cronbach’s alpha helped us to determine the reliability of the 
measurement values (end-users’ responses that are captured using 
multiple Likert questions). Table 1 highlights that the 3 constructs 
each having a specific value (i) security knowledge = 0.820, (ii) 
attitude (towards security) = 0.732, and (iii) behaviour (while using 
mHealth app) = 0.722. The values of Cronbach’s alpha were 
obtained by calculating the results of each dimension (e.g., only the 
attitude related to the statements were calculated together). Our 
results indicate that we met the minimum acceptable coefficient 
value (i.e., ≥ 0.7). 
Table 1. Cronbach’s alpha for end-users’ Knowledge, 
Attitude, and Behaviour. 
Constructs Cronbach’s alpha 
Knowledge 0.820 
Attitude 0.732 
Behaviour   0.722 
 
B. Measuring Correlation between Survey Statements: We 
conducted Pearson product-moment correlation (Pearson's 
correlation, for short) [38] to test the correlation (i.e., strength and 
direction of association) between the survey statements for 
obtained data, presented in Table 2 – Table 4. Specifically, Table 2 
– Table 4 show the correlation strength and significance among the 
survey statements for each dimension of security awareness (i.e., 
knowledge, attitude, and behaviour). All our survey statements 
showed a positive relationship ranging from strong (i.e., 0.86: 
access to health data) to a very weak (i.e., 0.02: changing the 
password regularly) relationship, as in Table 2. Only two 
statements in the attitude dimension (i.e., encrypting health data 
during transmission and storage, and changing the password 
regularly) showed a very weak negative relationship, as in Table 3. 
On the other side, our test results imply that 61% of our survey 
statements had a significant relationship (i.e., 48% at the 0.01 level, 
and 13% at the 0.05 level). This means that about 39% of our survey 
statements showed that there was no significant relationship 
between end-users security knowledge, attitude, and behaviour. For 
those reasons which are related to the correlation strength and their 
significance, we ensured that our survey items are measuring the 
interest through reviewing and clarifying any ambiguity. 
C. Descriptive Analysis of Responses: Table 5 presents a 
descriptive summary of end-users’ responses (R1 – R101) to the 
given (S1 – S23) in our survey [36]. For quantification and 
simplification of data analysis, we assigned numbers to the given 
options (i.e., True=1, Don't know=2, False=3). Frequency, 
percentage, mean and Standard Deviation (SD) are presented in 
Table 5. Since the middle value is 2, a mean of less than 2 implies 
that the respondents have agreed to the statement (True = 1). 
Whereas, a mean of greater than 2 implies that respondents have 
disagreed with the statement (False = 3). Our findings indicate that 
end-users have different opinions about (i) what they need to know 
(i.e., knowledge), (ii) why they should know (i.e., attitude) and (iii) 
how they should behave (i.e., behaviour) when it comes to using 
mHealth apps. For example, end-to-end data encryption (e.g., using 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with 128-bit encryption) is a 
method to secure data that travels across devices, over various 
networks, and accessed by a third-party. We provided two 
statements (S5 and S13) to examine our respondents' knowledge 
and attitude toward applying encryption within the used mHealth 
apps. Only 43/101 (i.e., 42.6%) of end-users believed that they 
should know whether or not their health data, which have been 
collected by mHealth apps, is sent and stored in an encrypted 
format. Whereas, 47/101 (i.e., 46.5%) of our respondents indicated 
that they are not aware whether or not their health data, which have 
been collected by mHealth apps, are encrypted during transmission 
and storage. In fact, one respondent (R33) commented that “[…] 
the responsibility to protect data is one of the patient's rights to be 
fulfilled by health service provider”. Thus, there is a need at app 
providers' end to share information with end-users about the 
existing features which make the apps more secure and trustable.  
Our results indicate that the respondents' level of security 
knowledge, attitude, and behaviour towards using mHealth app  
Figure 3 - Demographic Details of mHealth Apps End-Users 
(Sample Size =101) 
Table 2. Correlation for Security Knowledge Statements 
 
Table 3. Correlation for Attitude Statements 
 
Table 4. Correlation for Behaviour Statements 
 
vary. Such variations are primarily due to a number of factors that 
are presented in demographic details of the end-users (Figure 3). 
This indicates that respondents were not confident about some of 
the existing security measures implemented in the mHealth apps. 
The results indicate security specific documentation or education 
that must be provided to end-users from mHealth app providers. 
4.2 Correlation between End-Users Security 
Knowledge, Attitude, and Behaviour (RQ-2)  
To answer RQ-2, i.e., measuring the correlation, we utilized the 
KAB model (Figure 2) that measures end-user security awareness 
by examining three dimensions to test the outlined hypotheses (H1 
– H3). Therefore, we tested the hypothesis that there is a significant 
positive correlation between (a) the respondents’ knowledge which 
affects their attitude, and (b) the respondents’ knowledge and 
attitude, which affect their behaviour. We assigned the predictor 
variables to give us an estimation of the significance, and for that, 
we conducted regression analysis using SPSS software. As per the 
KAB model [17, 21] to measure the correlation, we considered 
knowledge as an exogenous variable and considered attitude and 
behaviour as two endogenous variables [21]. Thus, we performed 
two linear regression tests (i.e., one simple regression and one 
multiple regression), both detailed below, to assess the correlation 
of our variables.   
A. Simple Regression Test - Predicting Attitude based on 
Knowledge: A simple regression test is aimed to see whether we 
could predict attitude based on the knowledge that end-users had or 
not. Figure 4 presents our findings based on the correlation among 
knowledge, attitude and behaviour. Our analysis revealed that the 
knowledge variable had a statistically significant impact on the 
attitude variable producing R21= 0.602, (B=0.718, t= 12.236, p < 
.001). This means that our respondents’ knowledge accounted for 
60.2% of the variance in their attitude, which implies that, 
respondents’ knowledge is positively related to their attitude. For 
example, the survey statements (S14: 'I am aware that using one 
password for different accounts and apps will make it easy for me; 
but, it is insecure') was endorsed (True = 1) by 70% of the end-
users. Similarly, 70% of the end-users agreed (S6: 'I should use 
different passwords for different accounts and apps'). This 
correlation equated to B= 0.718 for H1: Security knowledge for the 
end-users of mHealth apps has a positive correlation with their 
attitude. 
Security Implementation Strategies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1. Sharing health data with third parties.  1  
 2. Accessing health data. .86** 1  
 3. Controlling access to health data.  .64** .64** 1  
 4. Requesting access to the data on the phone. .67** .56** .44** 1  
 5. Encrypting health data during transmission and storage. .47** .54** .35** .50** 1  
 6. Using the same password for different accounts. .27** .31**   .18    .16 .16 1  
 7. Using a strong password. .27** .33** .35** .20* .17 .71** 1  
 8. Changing the password regularly. .24** .19    .17 .31** .02 .15 .33** 1 
Security Implementation Strategies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1. Sharing health data with third parties. 1        
 2. Accessing health data. .57** 1       
 3. Controlling access to health data. .53
** .53** 1      
 4. Requesting access to the data on the phone. .51** .37** .45** 1     
 5. Encrypting health data during transmission and storage. .35
** .24* .21* .32** 1    
 6. Using the same password for different accounts. .18 .05 .25
* .22* .18 1   
 7. Using a strong password. .08 .17 .25
* .02 .06 .42** 1  
 8. Changing the password regularly. .04 .19 .11 .21
* -.05 .14 .42** 1 
Security Implementation Strategies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 1. Sharing health data with third parties.  1       
 2. Accessing health data. .66** 1      
 3. Controlling access to health data.  .52** .58** 1     
 4. Requesting access to the data on the phone. .48** .42** .49** 1    
 5. Using the same password for different accounts. .18* .22* .09 .06 1   
 6. Using a strong password.     .15    .18 .17 .17 .41** 1  
 7. Changing the password regularly.     .13 .20* .04 .18 .18 .26** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Statements 
True (1), 
n (%) 
Don’t know 
(2), 
n (%) 
False (3), 
n (%) 
Mean (SD) 
Knowledge related statements 
S1: I should be informed when my health data, which have been collected 
by mHealth apps, are being shared with third parties, such as other 
hospitals or clinics. 
68 (67.3) 17 (16.8) 16 (15.8) 1.49 (.756) 
S2: I should know who accesses my health data and for what purpose. 61 (60.4) 25 (24.8) 15 (14.9) 1.54 (.742) 
S3: I should have control of my health data. 54 (53.5) 25 (24.8) 22 (21.8) 1.68 (.812) 
S4: I should know that some apps request access to my health data (e.g., 
marketing purposes). 
50 (49.5) 35 (34.7) 16 (15.8) 1.66 (.739) 
S5: I should know whether my health data, which have been collected by 
mHealth apps, is sent and stored in an encrypted format. 
43 (42.6) 38 (37.6) 20 (19.8) 1.77 (.760) 
S6: I should use different passwords for different accounts and apps. 72 (71.3) 16 (15.8) 13 (12.9) 1.42 (.711) 
S7: I should use a strong password (not easy to guess) for the mHealth 
app. 
79 (78.2) 14 (13.9) 8 (7.9) 1.30 (.609) 
S8: I should change the password for the app regularly. 60 (59.4) 23 (22.8) 18 (17.8) 1.58 (.778) 
Attitude related statements 
S9: I am aware that my health data, which have been collected by mHealth 
apps, will not be shared with third parties, such as other hospitals or 
clinics. 
56 (55.4) 23 (22.8) 22 (21.8) 1.66 (.816) 
S10: I am aware of who accesses my health data and for what purpose. 37 (36.6) 36 (35.6) 28 (27.7) 1.91 (.801) 
S11: I am aware that having control of my health data provides security. 51 (50.5) 25 (24.8) 25 (24.8) 1.74 (.833) 
S12: I am aware that some apps request accessing health data more than 
they need. 
44 (43.6) 37 (36.6) 20 (19.8) 1.76 (.764) 
S13: I am aware that my health data, which have been collected by 
mHealth apps, are encrypted during transmission and storing. 
32 (31.7) 47 (46.5) 22 (21.8) 1.90 (.728) 
S14: I am aware that using one password for different accounts and apps 
will make it easy for me; but, it is insecure. 
71 (70.3) 15 (14.9) 15 (14.9) 1.45 (.741) 
S15: I am aware that using a strong password, that’s not easy to guess, for 
mHealth app provides security. 
82 (81.2) 8 (7.9) 11 (10.9) 1.30 (.656) 
S16: I am aware that changing the password for the app regularly provides 
security. 
62 (61.4) 17 (16.8) 22 (21.8) 1.60 (.826) 
Behaviour related statements 
S17: I get informed when my health data, which have been collected by 
mHealth apps, are being shared with third parties. 
49 (48.5) 23 (22.8) 29 (28.7) 1.80 (.860) 
S18: I know who access my health data and for what purpose. 38 (37.6) 30 (29.7) 33 (32.7) 1.95 (.841) 
S19: I already have control of my health data. 47 (46.5) 24 (23.8) 30 (29.7) 1.83 (.861) 
S20: I may accept or deny the request based on what I think is secure. 45 (44.6) 29 (28.7) 27 (26.7) 1.82 (.829) 
S21: I use different passwords for different accounts and apps. 64 (63.4) 12 (11.9) 25 (24.8) 1.61 (.860) 
S22: I use a strong password, that’s not easy to guess for mHealth app. 83 (82.2) 5 (5.0) 13 (12.9) 1.31 (.689) 
S23: I change my password of the app regularly. 45 (44.6) 9 (8.9) 47 (46.5) 2.02 (.959) 
 
B. Multiple Regression Test - Predicting Behaviour based on 
Knowledge and Attitude: The second regression tests the possibility 
of predicting end-users’ behaviour based on knowledge and 
attitude. Our analysis also revealed that both knowledge and 
attitude have a statistically significant impact on behaviour 
producing R22= 0.526, as in Figure 4. The results of multiple 
regression test indicate that our respondents’ knowledge and 
attitude account for 52.6% of the variance on their behaviour. 
Although, coefficient results indicate that attitude predictor is 
statistically significant, (B = .716, t = 5.713, p < .001), and yet, 
knowledge predictor is not statistically significant, (B = .125, t = 
1.076, p < .285). For example, we notice that many respondents, 
Table 5. Descriptive Summary of Responses to the Statements in the Survey (Sample Size: N=101) 
 
 
 
such as R32, R34, R42, R45, agreed that they knew and believe 
(i.e., knowledge and attitude) that mobile apps would be secure 
when using different passwords for different accounts and apps. 
However, their actual behaviour is not representing their 
knowledge and attitude. By reviewing the obtained data, 
particularly knowledge and behaviour responses, we notice a 
contradiction between what respondents should know (i.e., their 
knowledge) and how they should behave (i.e., their behaviour). For 
instance,  
- Knowledge and Attitude: 59% of our respondents reported that 
they knew that changing the password for the app frequently (S8 in 
Table 5) would enhance the security.  
- Knowledge and Behaviour: In reality, 47% of our respondents 
indicated that they did not change the password frequently, and 
thus, behaving according to the knowledge which they already had.  
The results of the multiple regression test provide support (B = 
.716, p < .001) for H2: Attitude of the end-users of mHealth apps 
is positively correlated with their behaviour and reject (B = .125, p 
< .285) H3: Security knowledge for the end-users of mHealth apps 
has a positive correlation with their behaviour. Overall, our results 
can be more robust in case we could have involved more 
respondents (e.g., sample size N = 300). We believe that the 
outcomes support the used model, and it is acceptable to evaluate 
the end-users’ security awareness toward using mHealth apps. The 
findings indicate that some of the respondents had good knowledge 
and attitude but did not demonstrate good behaviour, which could 
have exposed them to a significant risk. This is a clear indication of 
the need of providing end-users with suitable training to promote 
good security behaviour. Such strategy would also help to enhance 
their awareness when using mHealth apps. 
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK  
We now discuss the key results of our study and highlight the 
potential future work to extend this study’s findings. 
5.1 Overall Security Awareness of End-Users 
The answer to RQ-1 indicates end-users’ security-awareness for 
mHealth apps varies depending on different factors such as 
educational backgrounds, prior experience, IT specific 
understanding and age groups (Figure 3).  The analysis of the data 
in Table 3 and linking it with demographic information in Figure 3 
indicates that end-users’ of age group 30 – 49, who have moderate 
or advanced knowledge of IT systems and having at least a 
bachelor’s degree are well aware of the security issues pertaining 
to their health-critical data and personal information. However, the 
security knowledge of end-users does not always translate to the 
required behaviour that can make their data more secure. For 
example, despite the awareness about security criticality of health 
data, end-users rarely choose complex passwords and feel it 
inconvenient to frequently change passwords. By combining 
demographic details and statistical data analysis, we imply that the 
level of security-awareness varies and it is primarily influenced by 
users’ behaviour that can make their data more or less secure. RQ-
1 aims to investigate human-centric view towards security-aware 
usage of mHealth apps with a focus on (i) what the end-users’ know 
(i.e., knowledge), (ii) how they perceive security threats based on 
their knowledge (i.e., attitude), and (iii) why they should act to 
enable or enhance security (i.e., behaviour). This RQ does not 
answer what steps can be taken to enhance users’ knowledge, 
change their attitudes, and motivate them to behave in a manner 
that ensures the security and privacy of health-critical data.    
Needs for future research: It is interesting to observe that many 
respondents do not act according to their knowledge and attitude as 
shown in Table 2 – Table 3. This can be due to many factors such 
as the need of manual actions to enhance security (e.g., frequent 
password changes) and lack understanding for the consequences of 
security breaches. Future research can be focused on the 
effectiveness of formal training or security education, such as 
workshops, presentations, or hand on sessions that enhance security 
awareness of mHealth apps end-users. The scope of such research 
can go beyond mHealth apps to also investigate other mobile apps 
that deal with sensitive information (e.g., mobile banking apps). An 
investigation of the impact of security training on end-users’ 
security awareness can help to identify best practices, processes, 
and patterns that can be adopted as guidelines. As part of the future 
research, we aim to explore the practical approaches for security 
and their impacts on end-users.  
5.2 Correlation between KAB Model for 
Security Awareness 
The study [21] has indicated that better knowledge is associated 
with better attitude, and both are associated with better behaviour, 
and that leads to better security awareness about security risks and 
counter-measures. The findings of RQ-2 indicate that our 
respondents’ knowledge has a positive effect on their attitude, 
suggesting that the respondents have the necessary knowledge and 
attitude to ensure the security of mHealth apps. However, the 
analysis indicates that our respondents’ knowledge and attitude 
does not affect their self-reported behaviour (Figure 4). The 
explanation for our findings can be related to organizational factors 
(e.g., lack of security policy and guidelines) and individual factors 
(e.g., personality). Since our study is more focused on the security 
awareness of end-users toward using mHealth apps, the self-
reported behaviour results are slightly different than [21]. We 
targeted the respondents who are mainly using their own devices, 
and there are no assigned security policy and guidelines that they 
should follow. Unlike the scope of [21] that investigates how 
employees adhere to the existing security policy and guidelines 
when using organizations’ computers for network-based 
applications.  
Needs for future research: mHealth apps capture, process, and 
share health-critical data, and lack of security policy and guidelines 
for end-users is a critical challenge to be addressed. There is an 
urgent need of research efforts to develop appropriate security 
policies and guidelines for using mHealth apps so that end-users 
understand how to prevent security-related risks while using the 
Figure 4. Results in Support of the KAB Component of the 
HAIS-Q Model 
apps. Furthermore, the security policy and guidelines would 
explain the right actions that end-users need to take in different 
circumstances. At the same time, providing suitable security 
awareness regarding the policy and guidelines for the end-users is 
just as important as developing secure mHealth apps.  
6. THREATS TO VALIDITY 
We now discuss some threats to the validity that highlight the 
certain assumptions and/or potential limitations of our study. 
Threat I –Data Collection about End-User’ Behaviour: Our 
study relies on survey-driven feedback (Phase 3, Figure 1) as self-
reported knowledge, attitude, and behaviour of end-users that 
involves potential human bias in reporting. We tried to minimize 
this bias with the use of KAB [34] and HAIS-Q [17, 21] models, 
along with a pilot survey of 10/101 (approximately 10%) of the 
survey population. Based on the outlined hypothesis (Phase 2, 
Figure 1) and their validation (Section 4), respondents' knowledge 
had not influenced their behaviour towards mHealth security. We 
consider such correlation as an indication of fair responses by 
participants. In order to further minimize this threat, i.e., end-users’ 
behaviour and self-reporting about mHealth security, there is a need 
to incorporate further validation. In order to achieve that, we 
propose to implement an app with some simulated attacks such as 
excessive permissions from app and notifications for data ingested 
or transmitted out of the app. The app usage can help to monitor 
and record users’ actual behaviour based on the potential security 
flaws. An app based attack simulation approach can complement 
the survey-based results to compare the differences between self-
reported behaviour (via survey) and actual behaviour (via usage). 
Threat II– Sources of Data Collection and Sample Size: As per 
the study protocol (Phase 1, Figure 1), the data for this study has 
been collected via face-to-face meetings with the mHealth app 
users of two different mHealth provider (i.e., KFMC, HMG in 
Phase 3, Figure 2). The face-to-face sessions for data collection 
allowed us to notice and clarify any ambiguities faced by the 
participant of this study. The study’s questionnaire could have been 
further validated using better pilot testing (e.g., semi-structured 
interviews, focus group meetings). We qualitatively analyzed the 
data using different statistical methods (Phase 4, Figure 1); 
however; the study results can be affected by the sample size. Also, 
the policy and regulatory measures regarding the privacy of health-
critical data, consent of respondents, and capturing their feedback 
hampered us to collect more data. Moreover, all the end-users 
including, medics, health unit managers, clinical staff were based 
in the Saudi Arabia that limits geographical distribution of the 
participants (as indicated in Phase III of research method - Figure 
1). Therefore, the presented results may slightly vary due to policies 
and regulations, practices to be followed, and employed end-users 
by mHealth providers.  In order to minimise this threat, we plan to 
extend this study with collaboration from different mHealth 
providers and end-users at global level. A reader of this study 
should also consider that the results may also be influence by the 
policies and regulations, practices followed by mHealth services 
providers. In order to minimize this threat, we plan to extend this 
study by involving different mHealth providers and end-users at a 
global level scale. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
mHealth apps have started to revolutionize the healthcare sector – 
empowering stakeholders such as governments, health units, 
medics, and patients – by offering context-sensitive and pervasive 
health services. Despite the offered benefits, mHealth apps are 
prone to security issues related to health-critical data and personal 
information of app users. We conducted an empirical study by 
using well established models like KAB and HAIS-Q to measure 
human aspects of mobile security in the domain of mHealth 
systems. Specifically, we collected, synthesized, analyzed, and 
documented responses from 101 end-users of two mHealth apps 
regarding their security-awareness towards app usage. The analysis 
of the demography data of the end-users’ highlight that factors such 
as level of IT knowledge, age group, past experience with mHealth 
apps, mobile platforms they use, and educational backgrounds 
influence end users’ security-awareness (i.e., users’ knowledge, 
attitude, and behaviour ). The results suggest that end-users’ 
security specific: 
- Knowledge strongly influence their attitude towards security of 
mHealth apps. This means that users are aware of risks (e.g., 
stealing/tempering of health-critical data) and like to mitigate 
them (e.g., app support for data encryption).  
- Knowledge does not significantly influence their behaviour. 
This means that users are aware of risks (e.g., private data 
shared with third parties for targeted ads) but are reluctant or 
unware of appropriate actions that mitigate risks (e.g., setting 
privacy preferences to restrict undesired data access). 
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